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ABSTRACT 
Deregulation of the electricity market is an important issue in the energy sector. A major aim of deregulation is to 
increase competition among electricity retailers/suppliers and thereby enrich consumer choice among electricity 
products Retail energy markets are the final link in the energy supply chain. Energy retailers buy electricity in 
wholesale markets, package it with transportation services and sell it to customers. This is typically the main 
interface between the electricity industry, and customers such as households and small businesses. The electricity 
retailers are simply competing for the right to send a customer a bill, to package up a range of tariffs and lock the 
customers into a contract, also the opening to competition into retail electricity supply gives the opportunity to 
consumers to choose their own supplier. This paper analyze the profit of the retailer based on demand response(DR) 
and participation of customer in DR programs, also in this paper we consider stochastic programming and risk 
modeling of the retailer by LODA SHIFTING. 
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     INTRODUCTION 
Electric deregulation is the process of changing rules and regulations that control the electric industry to provide 
customers the choice of electricity suppliers who are either retailers or traders by allowing competition. 
Deregulation improves the economic efficiency of the production and use of electricity. Due to competition in the 
electric industry, the power prices are likely to come down which benefits the consumers.  
The main objectives of the deregulated power market: 
• To provide electricity for all reasonable demands. 
• To encourage the competition in the generation and supply of electricity. 
• To improve the continuity of supply and the quality of services. 
• To promote efficiency and economy of the power system. 
One of the another main of this paper is the use of DEMAND RESPONSE (DR) in power system; Demand response 
provides an opportunity for consumers to play a significant role in the operation of the electric grid by reducing or 
shifting their electricity usage during peak periods in response to time-based rates or other forms of financial 
incentives. Demand response programs are being used by some electric system planners and operators as resource 
options for balancing supply and demand. Such programs can lower the cost of electricity in wholesale markets, and 
in turn, lead to lower retail rates. Methods of engaging customers in demand response efforts include offering time-
based rates such as time-of-use pricing, critical peak pricing, variable peak pricing, real time pricing, and critical 
peak rebates. It also includes direct load control programs which provide the ability for power companies to cycle air 
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conditioners and water heaters on and off during periods of peak demand in exchange for a financial incentive and 
lower electric bills. 
The main purpose of this paper is survey and evaluation of the profit of the retailer of electricity market and 
maximizing it by considering TOU pricing and shifting loads of the customer (A form of load management that 
involves shifting from peak to off-peak periods. Examples are information programs that encourage customers to 
use storage water heating and storage space heating) and modeling the risk by related parameter like confidence 
level. The results are also analyzed in GAMS software. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Competition models have been introduced in many region of the world and will be introduced in another countries 
very soon in future [1,2]. In a retail competition model, an electricity market allows many participants including 
customers to compete with each other, through which monetary and environmental benefits can be obtained for 
customers and service providers of the market [3,4]. Paper [5] discuss some economic issues and models which are 
important to realize and manage the retail competition market, this paper conduct  case studies on the open access 
and the distribution automation. In [6], profit and risk of a retailer company which are obtained from future 
contracts, call option and wholesale market are investigated simultaneously. In [7] all points, mechanisms and 
strategies of the power system based on forming the electricity market and presence of different actors in this market 
are investigated, the main objective of this article is to propose approaches for optimizing manufacturer's profit and 
optimizing social welfare of the consumer. In [8] paper presents a new stochastic multi-layer agent-based model to 
study the behavior of electricity market participants. The wholesale market players including renewable power 
producers are modeled in the first layer of the proposed multi-agent environment. The players optimize 
bidding/offering strategies to participate in the electricity markets. In the second layer, responsive customers 
including plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) owners and consumers who participate in demand response (DR) programs 
are modeled as independent agents. In [9] a dynamic energy management framework, based on highly resolved 
energy consumption models, is used to simulate automated residential demand response. The models estimate the 
residential demand using a novel bottom-up approach that quantifies consumer energy use behavior, thus providing 
an accurate estimation of the actual amount of controllable resources. 
 
THEORETICAL BASIS OF RESEARCH 
3-1 Retail Choice Outcomes 
Retail choice appears to have the following impacts on innovative service offerings:  
1) Retail choice is extending the market penetration of dynamic pricing programs that reflect power system 
conditions. All other things equal, this improves the efficiency of use of power system resources, lowers the average 
costs of producing power, and tends to improve resource adequacy.  
2) Retail choice promotes renewable resources. To the extent that this raises the market penetration of intermittent 
resources such as wind and solar, it may raise resource adequacy issues because of the  non-dispatchability of such 
resources.  
3) Retail choice has a mixed record in promoting demand response.  
4) Retail choice has not generally promoted smart metering.  
3-2 Types of Open Electrical Energy Markets 
Bilateral Trading: As its name implies, bilateral trading involves only two parties: a buyer and a seller. Participants 
thus enter into contracts without involvement, interference or facilitation from a third party. Depending on the 
amount of time available and the quantities to be traded, buyers and sellers will resort to different forms of bilateral 
trading like Customized long-term contracts, Trading “over the counter”, Electronic trading 
The essential characteristic of these three forms of bilateral trading is that the price of each transaction is set 
independently by the parties involved. There is thus no “official” price [9-11]. 
Electricity pools: In the early days of the introduction of competition in electrical energy trading, bilateral trading 
was seen as too big a departure from the existing practice. Since electrical energy is pooled as it flows from the 
generators to the loads, it was felt that trading might as well be done in a centralized manner and involve all 
producers and consumers. Competitive electricity pools were thus created. Pools are a very unusual form of 
commodity trading but they have well-established roots in the operation of large power systems. In fact, some of the 
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competitive electricity pools currently in operation were developed on the basis of collaborative pools created by 
monopoly utility companies with adjacent service territories[11][12]. 
Comparison of pool and bilateral trading 
Since both the pool and the bilateral models of electrical energy trading have been adopted for electricity markets, it 
is worth reviewing the perceived advantages and disadvantages of both approaches. 
As mentioned above, a competitive electricity pool is often created on the basis of an existing cooperation 
agreement between various utilities. Its conversion to operation on a competitive basis will therefore be less of a 
revolution than the creation of a completely new structure. Some of the concerns that accompany the introduction of 
competition may be alleviated by the somewhat less radical nature of the change. 
In particular, the public and the government are likely to have fewer concerns about the security of the electricity 
supply if the same organization remains in charge. A pool provides a much more centralized form of system 
management. Not only does it handle all the physical electrical energy transactions but it usually also assumes the 
responsibility for operating the transmission system. This combination of roles avoids the multiplication of 
organizations but makes it more difficult to distinguish between the various functions that need to be performed in 
an electricity market. 
3-3 Influence of Demand Response programs 
Most electricity customers see electricity rates that are based on average electricity costs and bear little relation to 
the true production costs of electricity as they vary over time. Demand response is a tariff or program established to 
motivate changes in electric use by end-use customers in response to changes in the price of electricity over time, or 
to give incentive payments designed to induce lower electricity use at times of high market prices or when grid 
reliability is jeopardized. 
• Price-based demand response such as real-time pricing (RTP), critical-peak pricing (CPP) and time-of use (TOU) 
tariffs, give customers time-varying rates that reflect the value and cost of electricity in different time periods. 
Armed with this information, customers tend to use less electricity at times when electricity prices are high. In this 
study we use TOU tariffs. 
• Incentive-based demand response programs pay participating customers to reduce their loads at times requested by 
the program sponsor, triggered either by a grid reliability problem or high electricity prices. 
3-3-1 The Benefits of Demand Response 
Electricity production due to closer alignment between customers’ electricity prices and the value they place on 
electricity. This increased efficiency creates a variety of benefits, which fall into four groups: 
• Participant financial benefits are the bill savings and incentive payments earned by customers that adjust their 
electricity demand in response to time-varying electricity rates or incentive-based programs. 
• Market-wide financial benefits are the lower wholesale market prices that result because demand response averts 
the need to use the most costly-to-run power plants during periods of otherwise high demand, driving production 
costs and prices down for all wholesale electricity purchasers. Over the longer term, sustained demand response 
lowers aggregate system capacity requirements, allowing load-serving entities (utilities and other retail suppliers) to 
purchase or build less new capacity. Eventually these savings may be passed onto most retail customers as bill 
savings[13]. 
• Reliability benefits are the operational security and adequacy savings that result because demand response lowers 
the likelihood and consequences of forced outages that impose financial costs and inconvenience on customers. 
• Market performance benefits refer to demand response’s value in mitigating suppliers’ ability to exercise market 
power by raising power prices significantly above production costs [12-14]. 
3-4  Risk Modeling of the Problem 
Conditional value at risk (CVaR) is a risk assessment technique often used to reduce the probability that a portfolio 
will incur large losses. This is performed by assessing the likelihood (at a specific confidence level) that a specific 
loss will exceed the value at risk. Mathematically speaking, CVaR is derived by taking a weighted average between 
the value at risk and losses exceeding the value at risk. CVaR is also known as mean excess loss, mean shortfall, tail 
VaR, average value at risk or expected shortfall. CVaR was created to serve as an extension of value at risk (VaR). 
The VaR model allows managers to limit the likelihood of incurring losses caused by certain types of risk, but not 
all risks. In (1) & (2) the related equation of  this modeling  will be shown[11-13]. 
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PROBLEM FORMULATION AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4-1 Expected Profit 
Retailer's profit in the electricity market can be states as follows [12][13]: 
Difference between the revenue obtained from selling electricity to customers and the companies' costs in Pool 
contracts and buying energy from bilateral contracts, therefore the final profits depends on random and stochastic 
prices of Pool and customers' demands [14-17]. Accordingly if we want to define the retailer's profit before load 
shifting, we have: 
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Also we can define the retailer’s profit after load shifting like below: 
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Now, defining the elasticity for the customer is essential: 
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The retailer must maximize the difference between 𝐹𝐿 and 𝐹0 that introduced as an ∆F: 
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4-2 Stochastic Modeling of the Problem 
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c ≥
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 The objective function introduced in (8) contains CVaR of the profit at the confidence level α. 
 Equation (9) describe that, energy consumed by each customer in a month could not be changed. 
 Equation (10) imposes the demand ramp rate limits for per month (0≤ 𝑎 ≤ 1). 
 Constraints (12) state that the selling prices after modifications must be zero or positive. 
 
4-2 Generating Scenarios 
In stochastic programming models we always face the problem of how to represent the random variables. This is 
particularly difficult with multidimensional distributions. An example form of generating scenarios shown in figure 
(1), in this paper we consider 40 pool prices and generate these 40 scenarios besides generating 20 scenarios of 
elasticity for customers. 
 
 
Fig (1) - heuristic procedure for scenario generation 
 
CASE STUDY OF THE PROBLEM 
We consider three groups of customers, residential, commercial and industrial; we aggregate pool prices in 6 periods 
with TOU tariffs, also bilateral contract between customers and retailer studied for 1 month. Number of customers 
are 100. 84 customers are residential, 12 of them are residential and 4 of them are industrial. 
The consumption of per customer in peak and off-peak periods shows in table (1): 
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Table (1) - power consumption of customers 
 Consumption in off-peak periods(kw) Consumption in peak periods(kw) Customer 
2.9 3.6 84 residential 
49 60 12 commercial 
2000 3300 4 industrial 
 
Table (2)- presents selling price of peak and off-peak periods: 
Customer Selling price in Peak periods 
€/MWh)( 
Selling price in off-Peak periods 
€/MWh)( 
Residential 94 88 
Commercial 88 82 
Industrial 80 73 
 
Also we consider 75(€/MWh) for 7 MWh for the bilateral contracts. 
 
RESULTS & SIMULATION 
By considering equation (4)-(11) and solving the stochastic problem we can observe the price variation in order to 
encourage customers to shift their loads. The problem solved by GAMS software Using MINOS solver [18]. 
Figure (2) shows the price variation for peak periods and figure (3) shows the price variation for off-peak periods. 
The retailer of the electricity market will increase the prices in peak periods while decreases the prices in off-peak 
periods, also the price variation depend on the elasticity of the customers. It means that the price variations are 
higher for the customers that have lower elasticity.  
 
Fig (1) - price variations for peak periods 
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Fig (2) - price variations for off-peak periods 
 
In the following the power variations for the customers in peak and off-peak periods showed in figure (3) & (4): 
 
 
Fig (3) - power variation for peak periods 
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Fig (4) - power variation for off-peak periods 
 
For the fig (3) & (4) that show the power variation: power variation for each customers depends on the elasticity that 
influenced by uncertainty of the problem which modeled with 20 scenarios of elasticity. By fig (3) & fig (4) we can 
observe that in peak periods power variations are the lowest for industrial customers while the power variations are 
the highest for this customer in off-peak periods. 
Fig (5) & fig (6) presents the changes of CVaR and Expected profit of the retailer versus the confidence level (α): 
By increasing the confidence level, CVaR of the profit and Expected profit of the retailer decreases, by decreasing 
the expected profit and increasing the confidence level, energy price that imposed by the retailer will be low,  and 
therefore load shifting by customer will be decrease. 
 
 
Fig(5) - CVaR versus confidence level 
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Fig (6) - Expected Profit versus confidence level 
 
Table (3) shows the changes of CVaR and expected profit of the retailer for different values of α. 
 
Table (3)-CVaR and expected profit of the retailer 
 
α 
 
CVaR 
 
Expected Profit 
0.8 383.0293 488.9784 
0.85 369.2827 486.9314 
0.9 355.1922 484.1986 
0.95 333.2828 480.172 
 
SYMBOLS USED IN PAPER 
The symbols Used throughout retailer’s problem in this paper are: 
α         Confidence level 
b         Index for time periods for trading in bilateral market 
m        Index for months 
J          Index for customers 
r          Index for time periods for trading in pool market 
t          Index of time for trading with customers 
ω         Index of scenarios 
𝐹0=Expected profit of the retailer before shifting load 
𝐹𝐿=Expected profit of the retailer after shifting load 
𝑅𝜔=Profit of the retailer for scenario 𝟂 
∆F=Change in the expected profit 
∆Pjtω
C = rate of change of the power for the customer j, period t and scenario 𝟂 
∆λjt
C = rate of change of the price for the customer j, period t  
Ejtω= Elasticity of the customer j, period t and scenario 𝟂 
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Lb
B  =Number of hours of period b 
Lt
C  = Number of hours of period C 
NB= Number of time periods considered to trade through bilateral contracts 
NJ= Number of all customers 
NT= Number of time periods considered to trade with customers 
NR= Number of time periods considered to trade through pool 
Nω= Number of scenarios 
Pb
B= power bought through bilateral in period b 
Pjt
c= the power contracted in period t for customer j 
λjt
c = Price of the energy for customer j in period t 
λb
B= Price of the bilateral contracts in time period b 
λrω
P = Price of the pool in time period r and scenario 𝟂 
ξ = Auxiliary variable used to calculate the CVaR ($). 
μω = Auxiliary variable related to scenario ω used to calculate the CVaR ($). 
Α = Confidence level used in the calculation of the CVaR. 
πω= Probability of occurrence of scenario ω. 
θtr= Relationship between time period r and t 
Ωrb= Relationship between time period b and r 
Λtm = Relationship between time period m and t 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has proposed a stochastic programming model that allows an electricity retailer to set the prices and offer 
optimal selling these prices to clients. To procure the electric energy to be sold to its clients, a retailer copes with 
two main challenges: while buying, it faces uncertain pool prices; while selling, it faces the uncertainty of client 
demand and the fact that clients may select a different retailer if selling prices are not competitive enough. The risk-
aversion modeling is based on the CVaR. By this model in this paper the customers will encourage to shift their 
loads from peak periods to off-peak periods by considering TOU tariffs, in this way the retailer is interested in 
adapting the customer’s consumption with its energy availability, reducing the energy bought in the pool-based 
electricity market. In the final, if this model performs in a good way, besides increasing the profit of the retailer, the 
payment of the customer will decrease and getting to the social welfare in electricity market will be easy. 
For the future research we can use the role of wholesalers in electricity market and program the relation between 
wholesalers and retailers and customers to get the optimal point of the problem. Also this research can be examined 
in a system using DISTRIBUTED GENERATION regarding to renewable energy resources; by this situation we 
can analyze the profit of the retailer and payment of the customers. 
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